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Building Global Democracy
Anne-Marie Slaughter*
John Bolton cannot make up his own mind as to whether "we should take global
governance seriously." On the one hand, he argues that we must. "The costs to the
United States-reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty,
reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic and foreign
policy solutions-are far too great, and the current understanding of these costs far
too limited to be acceptable:" On the other hand, in the discussion following the
presentation of his paper at the conference hosted by the American Enterprise
Institute, he repeatedly disparaged the power and effectiveness of international
institutions. He claimed that the United Nations "can be an effective tool of
American foreign policy from time to time,"2 but that the United Nations ("UN")
Charter "has been violated so consistently, so often, by so many of its members, that [I
wonder] how much of it is really left."3 Similarly, he noted that the United States had
"withdrawn from the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") and what role does that have to play in the world? The ICJ is a joke and our
nonparticipation in it doesn't pose any material problems for us in the conduct of our
affairs."'
Bolton cannot have it both ways. Many contend that power politics continue to
prevail in the international system, in which case great powers like the United States
will use international institutions to further their own ends when they find it
convenient and disregard them when they do not.' Others argue that the system is
evolving toward a genuine global rule of law, in which international law and
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i. John Bolton, Sbould We Take Global Governance Seriously? 1 Chi J Intl L 205, 222 (2000).
2. John Bolton, Transcript of AEI Conference Proceedings, on file with the Chicago Journal of
International Law.
3. IL
4. Id.
5. See Stephen Krasner, Power and Constraint, 1 ChiJ Intl L 231 (2000).
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institutions meaningfuly constrain state choice.! But to maintain both positions at
once suggests that Bolton's primary aim is to polemicize and provoke, with little
regard for the facts.
The debate between these two positions is as old as international law itself. It is
far too broad and fundamental to engage in the space of these brief remarks. I will
focus instead on one of Bolton's more specific claims: the implications of global
governance for global, or at least national, democracy. Here he makes an important
point, one that international lawyers cannot afford to ignore. Yet although I agree
with his diagnosis of what is at least a potential problem, I disagree sharply with his
prescribed solution.
Instead of disengaging from international institutions, the United States must
work within them more equitably and effectively. Bolton's insistence on protecting a
narrow and outdated conception of sovereignty will only undermine US power and
ability to pursue its interests, including the advancement of its most fundamental
values. At the same time, however, the United States should take the lead in designing
a new generation of international institutions and redesigning old ones to ensure that
they include multiple mechanisms for ensuring popular participation.
To date, efforts to encourage such participation have focused on ensuring access
and input from non-governmental organizations (' NGOs"). But NGOs, although
important and often powerful actors, do not necessarily represent the world's peoples.
Governments do, particularly elected representatives sitting in national legislatures.
Yet in designing the institutions of global governance, these men and women are all
too often left out. Although space constraints preclude offering a detailed proposal in
this regard, I conclude by offering a suggestion for how the UN could develop a
mechanism for hosting networks of national legislators.
I. PRESERVING AMERICAN POWER AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
For the sake of argument in this brief commentary, I accept Bolton's dichotomy
between Americanists and Globalists, although not his description of the motives and
members of each camp. And I accept his proposition concerning a potential
democracy deficit to the extent that Globalists, in the way that he defines them, are
building a new generation of international institutions without directly engaging the
representatives of the people worldwide. The debate over the democracy deficit in the
European Union is exactly about a project that has engaged various people at the
supranational level and the subnational level but has left out in many ways the elected
representatives of the people. To the extent that the global governance project seeks to
replicate elements of the EU experience in the sense of establishing meaningful and
effective supranational institutions, it will confront the same obstacles.
6. See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon 1995).
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I also agree that the democracy deficit cannot be remedied by civil society alone,
to the extent that civil society means national, transnational, and international NGOs.
Not that NGOs should be vilified. They are the modern manifestations of de
Tocqueville's celebrated "associations,"' the "intellectual and moral associations" that
he argued were the backbone of American democracy.8 They play a vital role in
mobilizing individuals and representing their specific interests in ways that their
elected representatives cannot or will not. Today, those associations and interests
extend across borders, creating transnational networks of national associations. The
result is the increasingly self-conscious constitution of a transnational civil society.
That society, in turn, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic global
governance. NGOs are increasingly facing accountability problems of their own,
challenges that will only grow as their power increases.
The critical question is how to build global democracy to the extent necessary to
establish and enhance the legitimacy of existing and emerging international
institutions. Bolton's solution is to strengthen US democracy by forcing the United
States to pull out or not participate in international institutions and to reject any
constraints on sovereignty. "If we can't do it our way, then we just won't do it. But at
least we the people, the American people, will remain masters of our ship." That, in a
nutshell, is his argument.
His prescriptions for strengthening US democracy would weaken US power.
They would preserve US sovereignty, but at the expense of US leadership in the
global community. In many ways, US power depends not only on participating in
international institutions, but also on leading them. The prescription for pulling out
of international institutions mistakenly equates an abstract conception of sovereignty
with the realities of power.
Power is certainly military. It is certainly economic. As Stephen Krasner argues,
the United States is not suffering on those dimensions.9 But power in a nuclear era
and an interdependent global economy is also about influence, about our ability to
lead and to persuade others to shape the world the way we want to shape it.'0 That
requires engagement, not disengagement. Instead of rejecting international
institutions and treaties, we must work to shape them so that they conform to US
interests. That is what we did in 1945. That is what we need to do in 2000.
7. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 513-17 (Doubleday 1969) (J.P. Mayer, ed, and George
Lawrence, trans).
8. Id at 517.
9. Krasner, 1 ChiJ Intl L at 232 (cited in note 5).
lo. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Cbanging Nature of American Power 188 (Basic 1990); Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements (Harvard 1995).
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When other countries refuse to follow our lead, as they are doing more and
more, they may be balancing against us, but frequently what they say is: "You're still
not playing by the rules. We won't play with you. You're still not participating. You're
still not paying your UN dues. We don't have to listen to you." This is the world the
United States set up, after all. It was the United States that proclaimed that we
wanted a world under the rule of law. We wanted these institutions. We wanted them
because we thought they were the best safeguard of our security and power, and we
wanted other countries to play by those rules. But when we then refuse to honor our
commitments and obligations to those institutions under rules applicable to all, and
we refuse even to play, we lose our influence in ways that undermine our ability to
achieve our goals and our most fundamental values.
II. A NEw APPROACH TO BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
Disengagement is not the answer. But neither should the United States
uncritically embrace the projects of other countries or global governance for its own
sake. The order and enhanced cooperation afforded by international institutions
advance US interests. So too does enhanced democratic representation in global law-
making, decision-making, or simply consensus-building. The United States, often
hobbled in other nations' eyes by its own democratic processes, should take the lead
not only in educating the American people about the benefits of multilateral
engagement, but also in educating the world about not only the necessity but the
benefits of enhancing the voice of the people in global governance.
A. Not Only NGOs... Here Bolton is right to critique the overwhelming focus on
NGOs. Taking the UN, as he does, as the archetypal example, consider the Secretary
General's Millennium Report, prepared for the UN Millennium Summit to be held in
September 2000. It is entitled "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in
the 21st Century." The Prologue declares: "no shift in the way we act or think can be
more critical than this: we must put people at the centre of everything we do."" Yet
consider the ways the Secretary General proposes to fulfill this mission.
The Report lays out an ambitious and vital substantive policy agenda focused on
the goals of preventing conflict, promoting human rights and economic development,
developing a legitimate and effective framework for humanitarian intervention,
strengthening peace operations, targeting sanctions, pursuing arms reductions, and
protecting the global environment. The Secretary General recognizes, however, that
such goals cannot be achieved without major institutional reform, beyond
streamlining the UN bureaucracy and management systems. He proposes harnessing
the power of both civic and corporate non-state actors through "global policy
11. Kofi A. Annan, Millennium Report of the United Nations Secretary-General: We the Peoples: The Role of the
United Nations in the 21st Century 7, UN Doc DPI/2103 (2000).
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networks," "coalitions for change" that bring together international institutions, civil
society and private sector organizations, and national governments in pursuit of
common goals. 2 Developing a more "focused and systematic approach" toward
including these networks in global governance processes will transform the UN from
an international to a genuinely global institution capable of responding to the
contemporary challenges of globalization. 3
Closer examination of this proposal, however, reveals a significant omission. The
Millennium Report highlights the potential of using the UN to enhance the role of
multinational corporations as bearers of "global corporate citizenship."14 It also devotes
several pages to the exponential growth of NGOs and their critical role in mounting
global campaigns to establish a land mine treaty and an international criminal court.
But it pays only lip service to the involvement of national government officials in these
networks, notwithstanding the emphasis elsewhere in the Millennium Report on the
role of the state. 6 It offers no specific recommendations on how to engage national
officials charged with regulating virtually all of the substantive issues on the UN
agenda, from public health to arms control to the environment.
B.... But Also National Legislators. In fact, networks of national officials are one of
the fastest growing mechanisms of global governance, though one all too often
ignored The internationalization of jobs once thought exclusively to be a domestic
preserve has been one of the byproducts of globalization, such that networks of central
bankers, securities commissioners, and insurance supervisors are playing an
increasingly important role in regulating the global economy. In other areas, too, from
criminal law enforcement to competition policy to environmental protection,
networks of national ministers are coordinating national action and collaborating on
resolving common problems. The European Union has institutionalized this mode of
government through its Council of Ministers. But other international institutions,
12. Id at 70.
13. Id at 71,11-12.
14. Id at 14.
iS. Id at 70-71.
16. Idat 13.
17. Sol Picciotto, Networks in International 'Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-
Liberalisn, 17 NwJ Ind L & Bus 1014 (1996-97). See also Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-operation for
an Interdependent World: Issues for Government, in Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World 15
(OECD 1994), ("[A] web of formal and informal intergovernmental regulatory relationships is
emerging in the OECD area (and beyond) that simultaneously empowers and constrains
governments with respect to their ability to solve problems through regulation."); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, The New Real World Order 76 Foreign Aff 183 (Sept/Oct 1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth,
eds, Democratic Governance and International Law 199 (Cambridge 2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Governing the Global Economy througb Government Networks, in Michael Byers, ed, The Role of Law in
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law 177 (Oxford 2000); Anne-
Marie SlaughterJudicial Globalization 40 VaJ Intl L (forthcoming 2000).
Fall 2ooo
Sfaqug~ter
CbicagoJournaf of Internationa( Jaw
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, have devised creative ways to incorporate these "government
networks" into international and supranational processes.
The United Nations would do well to follow suit, if only by periodically hosting
meetings of existing government networks with the aim of linking them up with
relevant NGOs and international agencies. Recognizing the role of existing
transgovernmental networks and working to integrate them with supranational and
subnational actors will enhance the effectiveness of UN initiatives by reaching beyond
the often insular diplomatic world of UN ambassadors. But it will not solve the UN's
accountability problems, in the larger sense of enhancing global democracy. Networks
of regulators and judges, the two domains in which transgovernmental activity is most
intense, raise their own accountability problems. Regulators and judges, even in
democracies, are generally unelected officials and are often deliberately insulated from
national political processes. Thus to the extent the UN faces the problem of not
being, or being perceived to be, the voice of "we the peoples," reaching out to
regulators and judges is not enough.
The missing piece in the Secretary General's proposals is a role for national
legislators-the elected representatives of the people. SenatorJesse Helms' visit to the
United Nations in January 2000 was widely regarded as a diplomatic debacle, in light
of his blunt rejection of the organization's aims and self-conception. More generally,
the visit reinforced worldwide perceptions that the US Congress, and by extension
any national legislators who respond more to local concerns than global imperatives, is
the problem-not the solution. Elected political bodies are certainly messy and
imperfect mechanisms for governance at any level. They are fractious and difficult to
lead. They typically respond to short-term rather than long-term interests. They
reflect all the imperfections of the voters they represent, magnified by the distortions
and pathologies of the election process itself, which vary from country to country. But
they are indispensable to legitimate and accountable national government. They will
prove equally indispensable to legitimate and accountable global governance.
The United Nations should take the lead in creating fora not only for NGOs
and multinational corporations, but also for national parliamentarians directly
engaged with the national regulation of issues on the global policy agenda. It could
start with regular meetings, under UN auspices, of the heads of foreign relations
committees in national parliaments. Jesse Helms' visit should become the rule, not the
exception, but not to address the Security Council. He should be invited to engage his
counterparts around the world, to share his constituents' concerns over both
18. Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in International Affairs: A Review of the
Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime, Geo Wash Ind L Rev (forthcoming, 2000); see also Scott C.
Fulton and Lawrence I. Sperling, The Network of Environmental Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation
in North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30 Ind Law 111 (1996).
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substantive policies and institutional mechanisms to achieve them. In the most
optimistic scenario, he might find over time that some of the concerns of North
Carolina voters echo concerns of voters around the world on issues where the United
Nations can play a constructive role. More pessimistically, his views might simply
confirm the current gulf between the perceptions and priorities of many Americans
and those of many other peoples. But, at the very least, he would find it more difficult
to portray the United Nations as John Bolton does, as an elitist diplomatic
organization seeking to substitute world government for national government.
The Secretary General's Millennium Report makes much of the finding in a global
public opinion poll that "governments received even lower ratings than the United
Nations. In most countries, a majority said their elections were free and fair, but as
many as two thirds of all respondents felt that their country, nevertheless, was not
governed by the will of the people."19 These respondents may have been reflecting fears
that national governments are being tossed like flotsam on the tide of globalization.
But they are unlikely to turn to the United Nations or any other international
institution as the answer if it means bypassing or further disempowering their elected
representatives. These individuals are ultimately the only instruments of government
the voters control.
Globalists are right to insist that technology, the urgency of genuinely global
problems, and political and economic interdependence make it increasingly impossible
to conduct national politics without global institutions. But if all politics are becoming
global, they also remain local. To the extent that global institutions require at least a
measure of global democracy, they will also require reaching out to a host of state as
well as non-state actors. National legislators, however parochial and recalcitrant they
seem, are a fine place to start.
19. Annan, Millennium Report at 16 (cited in note 11).
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